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Abstract
The Mahalanobis distance-based confidence
score, a recently proposed anomaly detection
method for pre-trained neural classifiers, achieves
state-of-the-art performance on both out-of-
distribution and adversarial example detection.
This work analyzes why this method exhibits such
strong performance while imposing an implausi-
ble assumption; namely, that class conditional
distributions of intermediate features have tied
covariance. We reveal that the reason for its ef-
fectiveness has been misunderstood. Although
this method scores the prediction confidence for
the original classification task, our analysis sug-
gests that information critical for classification
task does not contribute to state-of-the-art per-
formance on anomaly detection. To support this
hypothesis, we demonstrate that a simpler confi-
dence score that does not use class information is
as effective as the original method in most cases.
Moreover, our experiments show that the confi-
dence scores can exhibit different behavior on
other frameworks such as metric learning mod-
els, and their detection performance is sensitive
to model architecture choice. These findings pro-
vide insight into the behavior of neural classifiers
when provided with anomalous inputs.
1. Introduction
Modern neural networks classifiers often exhibit unexpected
behavior to inputs dissimilar from training data (Gal, 2016;
Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017). Furthermore, it is known
that neural classifiers are easily fooled by small adversarial
perturbations to inputs (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015). Since these problems
pose a serious threat to the safety of machine learning sys-
tems, anomaly detection methods such as out-of-distribution
and adversarial example detection have attracted consider-
able attention (Pimentel et al., 2014; Hendrycks & Gimpel,
2017; Li & Li, 2017). However, anomaly detection for high-
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Figure 1. Final features of a convolutional neural network classi-
fier trained on MNIST. The penultimate feature space is set to two
dimensions. Black ovals are contours of the Mahalanobis distance
with the tied covariance assumption for two classes as Lee et al.
(2018) proposed. The Mahalanobis distance does not properly
capture the features of the class conditional distributions in this
example. In fact, for out-of-distribution detection for MNIST vs.
Fashion-MNIST on this penultimate feature space, AUROC of the
Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance are 80.78 and 82.88. How-
ever, the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score achieves
state-of-the-art performance on both out-of-distribution and adver-
sarial example detection in other practical settings.
dimensional data is a difficult task, and behavior of neural
networks towards anomalous inputs is not well understood.
Distance-based methods are a primitive yet popular ap-
proach to anomaly detection. Although they have been well
studied for low-dimensional data (Pimentel et al., 2014),
distance-based methods applied to high-dimensional data
suffer from the curse of dimensionality. One way to address
this problem is to use a lower dimensional representation
of data. Some previous studies on out-of-distribution (Song
et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2018; Papernot & Mcdaniel, 2018)
and adversarial example detection (Feinman et al., 2017;
Ma et al., 2018; Gilmer et al., 2018) use the Euclidean dis-
tance of intermediate representations in neural networks. In
this line of research, recent work of anomaly detection on
intermediate features of pre-trained neural classifiers (Lee
et al., 2018) shows that the Mahalanobis distance-based con-
fidence score outperforms methods based on the Euclidean
distance. This method achieves state-of-the-art performance
in out-of-distribution and adversarial example detection, and
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is regarded as the new standard in anomaly detection on pre-
trained neural classifiers (Ren et al., 2019; Rajendran &
Levine, 2019; Tardy et al., 2019; Roady et al., 2019; Wang
et al., 2019; Maceˆdo et al., 2019; Ahuja et al., 2019; Cohen
et al., 2019). However, why it works so well has not been
sufficiently investigated. In this work, we reveal that the
behavior of intermediate features with regard to anomalous
inputs has been misunderstood. The Mahalanobis distance-
based method by Lee et al. (2018) constructs the prediction
confidence for the original classification task, a similar idea
to the method by Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017) that uses the
output of the softmax function as a confidence score. How-
ever, our analysis shows that the information in intermediate
features that is not critical for the original classification
task is the main contribution to state-of-the-art performance
of the method. Namely, the subspace spanned by princi-
pal components with small explained variance, which may
not be expected to have useful information about the input,
contains information critical for anomaly detection.
Our analysis is motivated by an unreasonable assumption;
Lee et al. (2018) assumes that class conditional distribu-
tions of the final features have tied covariance, and uses
the Mahalanobis distances from class means as confidence
scores. This assumption is not consistent with observations
in previous work. The standard framework of neural clas-
sifiers with a softmax function following a fully connected
layer evaluates similarity based on inner products. Thus, the
final features are radially distributed as the decision rule is
largely determined by angular similarity (Wen et al., 2016;
Liu et al., 2016) as shown in Figure 1. Ahuja et al. (2019)
has already pointed out this problem of the assumption, and
proposed usage of more representative class of distributions
to estimate class conditional distributions. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no prior work analyzing why
the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score can detect
anomalous samples effectively despite imposing this unre-
alistic assumption. Our analysis reveals that information
on intermediate features that is not critical for the original
classification task contributes to its state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in anomaly detection. We also propose a simpler
method named the marginal Mahalanobis distance-based
confidence score. This method approximates intermediate
feature distribution with a single Gaussian distribution, and
uses the Mahalanobis distance from the mean as confidence
scores. In most settings of anomaly detection, our method,
while not using class information at all, is competitive with
the original confidence score based on class conditional
distributions.
Furthermore, we evaluate the Mahalanobis distance-based
confidence score on representation spaces of distance-based
metric learning methods. The representation spaces of met-
ric learning behave differently from these of neural classi-
fiers towards anomalous inputs, and the Mahalanobis dis-
tance works poorly in some of these cases. While Lee et al.
(2018) suggests that their confidence score is widely appli-
cable to other frameworks such as few-shot learning, our
observation implies that this is not the case, as the method
may utilize a unique property of ordinary neural classifiers.
We also observe that detection performance of the confi-
dence score depends on model architecture choice. Con-
sequently, we note that caution is needed when applying
the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score to new
architectures or data sets.
2. Related Work
High-Dimensional Out-of-distribution Detection Al-
though out-of-distribution detection has been well stud-
ied for low-dimensional data (Pimentel et al., 2014), re-
cent work has shown that it does not work well for
high-dimensional data. For a pre-trained neural classifier,
Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017) proposed a method using the
output of the softmax function as a confidence score, and
Liang et al. (2018) improved upon this. Hendrycks et al.
(2019) proposed to use out-of-distribution data during train-
ing to improve out-of-distribution detectors. An approach
related to this paper is the use of lower dimensional repre-
sentations in neural networks. Mandelbaum & Weinshall
(2017) proposed a confidence score based on local den-
sity estimation in the embedding spaces of neural networks.
There is some work using intermediate features of autoen-
coders as well (Sabokrou et al., 2018; Denouden et al., 2018;
Perera et al., 2019).
Adversarial Examples Detection Adversarial examples
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) are a major
concern of modern neural networks. A popular approach
to avoid this problem is to make neural networks robust to
adversarial attacks with methods such as adversarial training
(Goodfellow et al., 2015). Another approach to mitigate ad-
versarial attacks related to this paper is adversarial example
detection. Li & Li (2017) proposed usage of a cascade de-
tector on features acquired via principal component analysis
(PCA) on intermediate representations. Grosse et al. (2017)
examined statistical properties of adversarial examples, and
Ma et al. (2018) proposed usage of the Local Intrinsic Di-
mensionality (LID). However, Carlini & Wagner (2017)
has reported that these detection methods can be bypassed
relatively easily.
3. Background
In this section, we first describe the Mahalanobis distance-
based confidence score by Lee et al. (2018). We then explain
the relationship between the Mahalanobis distance and PCA,
which motivates our analysis in Section 4.1.
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3.1. Mahalanobis Distance-Based Confidence Score
Lee et al. (2018) proposed a confidence score for anomaly
detection based on the class-conditional Mahalanobis dis-
tance with the assumption of tied covariance. This method
is motivated by an induced generative classifier. Here, we
consider a generative classifier with the assumption that
P (t = c) = βc/
∑
c′ βc′ and class-conditional distribu-
tions follow Gaussian distributions with tied covariance
N (x|µc,Σ). Then, its posterior distribution P (t = c|x)
can be represented in the following manner:
exp(µTc Σ
−1x− 12µTc Σ−1µc + log βc)∑
c′ exp(µc′Σ
−1x− 12µTc′Σ−1µc′ + log βc′)
. (1)
This posterior distribution is equivalent to a softmax clas-
sifier by considering µTc Σ
−1 and − 12µTc Σ−1µc + log βc to
be the weights and biases. This observation leads to the
idea that the final features of pre-trained neural classifier
might follow a class-conditional Gaussian distribution, and
the Mahalanobis distances from class means represent confi-
dence scores of the classification, which is more informative
than the output of the softmax function. Given training data
{(x1, t1), . . . , (xn, tn)}, the parameters of the generative
classifier can be estimated as follows:
µˆc =
1
nc
∑
i:ti=c
f(xi) (2)
Σˆ =
1
n
∑
c
∑
i:ti=c
(f(xi)− µˆc)(f(xi)− µˆc)T (3)
where f(·) denotes the output of the penultimate layer, and
nc is the number of training examples with label c. The
Mahalanobis distance-based score is calculated as the mini-
mum squared Mahalanobis distance from the class means:
M(x) = max
c
−(f(x)− µˆc)T Σˆ−1(f(x)− µˆc). (4)
To improve detection performance, the authors proposed
input pre-processing similar to Liang et al. (2018) and a
feature ensemble consisting of logistic regression using the
confidence scores from all layers.
3.2. Mahalanobis Distance and PCA
The Mahalanobis distance can be alternatively represented
by using the eigenvectors ui of the covariance matrix Σ
(Murphy, 2012):
∆2 = (x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ) =
N∑
i=1
y2i
λi
(5)
where N is the dimension of data, λi is the i-th eigen-
value, and yi = uTi (x− µ). Note that the eigenvectors and
eigenvalues of data sets can be interpreted as the principal
components and explained variance of principal component
analysis, so this formulation shows the relationship between
the Mahalanobis distance and PCA. This observation moti-
vates our analysis in Section 4.1.
4. Analysis
While Lee et al. (2018)’s Mahalanobis distance-based confi-
dence score imposes the implausible assumption that covari-
ance matrices of class conditional distributions of interme-
diate features are tied, the method achieves state-of-the-art
results on both out-of-distribution and adversarial example
detection. Since it is clear that the method is not superior for
low-dimensional cases (Figure 1), we hypothesize that it uti-
lizes a property of high-dimensional feature spaces. When
a representation space is low-dimensional, all dimensions
may be used to represent information critical for classifica-
tion. However, in high-dimensional cases, a small number
of directions will explain almost all variance of training data,
and most of directions may not contribute to classification.
Therefore, in high-dimensional cases, we hypothesize that
the directions which are not important for the original clas-
sification task contribute to anomaly detection (Figure 2).
Our hypothesis is supported by observations presented in
this section and experiments in Chapter 5.
4.1. Partial Mahalanobis Distance
Definition As mentioned in Section 3.2, the squared Maha-
lanobis distance is equivalent to the squared sum of principal
component scores (Equation 5). Here, examine the partial
sum:
∆2S =
∑
i∈S
y2i
λi
, S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} (6)
We will refer to this metric as the partial Mahalanobis dis-
tance. We use the partial Mahalanobis distance to analyze
the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score. For ac-
Figure 2. Visualization of our hypothesis on the structure of inter-
mediate features in neural classifiers. We hypothesize that direc-
tions with small explained variance, while containing relatively
less information relevant to classification, strongly contribute to
anomaly detection.
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(a) CIFAR-10 (training data) (b) CIFAR-10 (test data) vs. SVHN (c) CIFAR-10 (test data) vs. SVHN
Figure 3. PCA on the final features of ResNet trained on CIFAR-10. The corresponding class mean is subtracted from each input. (a) The
proportion of variance of training data. The first several principal components explain almost all variances. (b) Variance of the penultimate
layers of CIFAR-10 (test data, blue) and SVHN (out-of-distribution, red) on 1st to 30-th principal components. (c) Variance on 370-th to
420-th principal components. SVHN has larger variance even when the explained variance are small.
Table 1. Analysis of out-of-distribution performance of the partial Mahalanobis distance on ResNet trained on CIFAR-10. The out-of-
distribution data is SVHN. “All” denotes the original Mahalanobis distance using all features, and “Partial (i− j)” denotes the partial
Mahalanobis distance using i-th to j-th principal components. The partial Mahalanobis distance using principal components with small
explained variance (Partial (10-512)) works better than that using principal components with large explained variance (Partial (1-9)).
Method TNR atTPR 95% AUROC
Detection
Accuracy
AUPR
in
AUPR
out
All (original) 91.60 93.92 89.13 91.56 95.96
Partial (10-512) 96.73 94.05 89.27 91.70 96.11
Partial (1-9) 93.70 88.09 84.66 83.47 92.35
Euclidean 93.61 89.33 84.98 84.89 92.43
tual implementation, we simply calculate the Mahalanobis
distance with features projected to the corresponding princi-
pal components in order to avoid numerical instability.
Experiments Figure 3a shows the proportion of variance
when PCA is applied to the in-distribution final features of
ResNet trained on CIFAR-10. Here, the corresponding class
mean is subtracted from each feature. It shows that the first
nine components explain almost all of the variance of the
features. We evaluate two partial Mahalanobis distances to
analyze behavior of the final features of anomalous inputs.
The first one is ∆2[1,9] =
∑9
i=1 y
2
i /λi and the second one is
∆2[10,512] =
∑512
i=10 y
2
i /λi, where the principal components
are sorted in descending order with respect to the proportion
of variance. Table 1 shows out-of-distribution detection
performance using different confidence scores. The results
show that ∆2[10,512] solely achieves the performance by the
original Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score while
it uses information on principal components with very small
explained variance. On the contrary, the performance of
∆2[1,9] is worse and similar to that by the Euclidean distance
while it uses principal components explaining most of the
variances in training data. This observation suggests that
the subspace spanned by principal components with small
explained variance contains information critical for anomaly
detection. Therefore, the major difference in performance
between the Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance is caused
by sensitivity to perturbations on principal components with
small explained variance, which contain information critical
for anomaly detection.
Figure 3b and c compares variances of the final features
of in-distribution data (test data of CIFAR-10) and out-of-
distribution data (SVHN) on each principal components.
Here, we subtract the nearest class mean in terms of the
Mahalanobis distance from each input. Figure 3b shows
that out-of-distribution data has large variances on princi-
pal components with large explained variance. This is an
expected result as the principal components with large ex-
plained variance may represent important features of data,
so it may capture difference between in-distribution and out-
of-distribution inputs. However, note that variance of out-
of-distribution data is large even on principal components
with small explained variance, which may not be expected
to contain useful information about input data (Figure 3c).
Li & Li (2017) reported a similar observation for adversar-
ial examples. Our analysis reveals that this phenomenon
also occurs towards out-of-distribution data, and the Maha-
lanobis distance-based confidence score effectively captures
this property of anomalous inputs on the intermediate fea-
tures.
4.2. Marginal Mahalanobis Distance
Definition The analysis of partial Mahalanobis distances
suggests that principal components of the final features with
small explained variance contribute to out-of-distribution
detection. However, principal components with small ex-
plained variance may not contain information relevant to
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Table 2. Out-of-distribution detection performance of the marginal Mahalanobis distance on ResNet trained on CIFAR-10 The out-of-
distribution data is SVHN. “Conditional” denotes the original Mahalanobis distance (Lee et al., 2018). “Marginal” represents our marginal
Mahalanobis distance, and “Marginal (10-512)” represents the partial Mahalanobis distance using 10-th to 512-th principal components
of the marginal Mahalanobis distance. Here, PCA is applied to the original features without subtracting class means. “Euclidean” denotes
the Euclidean distance from the mean. “Ensemble” and “Pre-processing” denote features ensemble and input pre-processing proposed.
The out-of-distribution detection performance by the marginal Mahalanobis distance is competitive to the original Mahalanobis distance.
Method Ensemble Pre-processing TNR atTPR 95% AUROC
Detection
Accuracy
AUPR
in
AUPR
out
Conditional 91.60 93.92 89.13 91.56 95.96
Marginal 96.72 93.92 88.93 91.46 96.12
Marginal (10-512) 96.72 93.94 88.95 91.48 96.09
Euclidean 93.61 89.33 84.98 84.89 92.43
Conditional o 91.45 98.37 93.55 96.43 99.35o o 96.42 99.14 95.75 98.26 99.60
Marginal o 91.33 98.33 93.50 96.27 99.34o o 96.01 99.10 95.54 98.14 99.60
classification. Motivated by this observation, we propose
to use the Mahalanobis distance with the assumption that
the marginal distribution is Gaussian, which ignores class
information. Here, the model parameters are estimated as
follows:
µˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(xi) (7)
Σˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(f(xi)− µˆ)(f(xi)− µˆ)T . (8)
Based on the estimated parameters, we use the Mahalanobis
distance from µˆ, the global mean:
M ′(x) = −(f(x)− µˆ)T Σˆ−1(f(x)− µˆ) (9)
as a confidence score instead of using class conditional
distributions.
Experiments Table 2 shows that the marginal Mahalanobis
distance achieves almost the same performance as the orig-
inal class conditional Mahalanobis distance-based score.
Notably, “Mahalanobis (10-512)” effectively detects out-of-
distribution inputs while only using principal components
with small explained variance. This observation supports
our hypothesis that the Mahalanobis distance-based con-
fidence score uses information that is not critical for the
original classification task. We also evaluate feature ensem-
ble and input pre-processing proposed by Lee et al. (2018),
and show that these techniques are also effective on our
marginal Mahalanobis distance score.
Additionally, we conduct a simple experiment to verify
the hypothesis that information in the final features that
is relatively unimportant for classification contributes to
state-of-the-art performance in out-of-distribution detection.
We apply PCA to the penultimate features, and evaluate
classification using some of the principal components. The
logistic regression on the final features of neural classifiers
trained on CIFAR-10 achieves 94.11% accuracy when all
principal components are used. The classifier using first 9
principal components achieves 94.05%, but that using 10-th
to 512-th components only achieves 20.48%. These results
suggest that principal components with small explained vari-
ance do not contain information critical for classification.
However, they contribute to anomaly detection as shown
in “Mahalanobis (10-512)” of Table 2. This analysis pro-
vides an explanation that the Mahalanobis distance-based
confidence score outperforms a method based on the output
of the softmax function (Liang et al., 2018) as the softmax
function only provides information related to classification.
We further evaluate the marginal Mahalanobis distance in
Section 5.2.
4.3. Analysis of Input Pre-processing
Lee et al. (2018) has proposed the following input pre-
processing:
xˆ = x+ εsign(∇xM(x)) (10)
where ε is the magnitude of noise. While this considerably
improves the detection performance, the mechanism of its
contribution has not been analyzed well. This method is sim-
ilar to the pre-processing by Liang et al. (2018) that takes the
gradient of the cross-entropy. For cross-entropy loss, Liang
et al. (2018) demonstrated that the norms of the gradients for
in-distribution data tend to be larger than those for out-of-
distribution data, so the pre-processing increases confidence
for in-distribution data more than that for out-of-distribution
data. However, in the input pre-processing for the Maha-
lanobis distance, we observe the opposite behavior. Fig-
ure 4a shows that L1 norms of the differences between the
original and pre-processed features on the penultimate layer
for the class conditional Mahalanobis distance. It shows
that L1 norms of SVHN (out-of-distribution data) tend to be
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(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) SVHN (d) AUROC
Figure 4. Analysis of input pre-processing. (a) L1 norm of the difference between the original and pre-processed features (ε = 1) on the
penultimate layer. SVHN (out-of-distribution data) has larger norm than CIFAR-10 (in-distribution data). (b) (c) The mean Mahalanobis
distance of CIFAR-10 and SVHN on the final features with different levels of input pre-processing. For both of the data sets, the
Mahalanobis distances once decrease. However, after they reach the minimum values, the distance on SVHN features increases faster
than that on CIFAR-10 as the magnitude increases because the gradients are larger on SVHN. (d) As a result, the detection performance
improves after it reaches the minimum value. This observation is opposite to what reported by Liang et al. (2018) for cross-entropy loss.
larger than those for CIFAR-10 (in-distribution data). As a
result, the input pre-processing lowers the Mahalanobis dis-
tance and increase confidence for out-of-distribution inputs
more than for in-distribution data. However, as shown in
Figure 4b and c, the mean Mahalanobis distance on the final
features of SVHN increase much faster than that of CIFAR-
10 as the magnitude increases after it reaches the minimum
value. For ε = 0.01, the mean Mahalanobis distance of
CIFAR-10 is still lower than that for ε = 0, while that of
SVHN is much larger than the original value. As a result, the
detection performance is improved from 98.37 to 99.14 in
AUROC. These results and Figure 4d suggest that a proper
magnitude that increases the Mahalanobis distances of out-
of-distribution inputs more than those of in-distribution data,
the detection performance will be improved. We provide
further experimental results in the appendix.
4.4. Applicability and Limitations
Lee et al. (2018) has suggested that their confidence score
may be applied to other architectures such as few-shot learn-
ing. Our experiments in Section 5.3 show that the situation
is not that simple; the method does not always work effec-
tively on metric learning. This observation suggests that
the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score utilizes a
unique property of ordinary neural classifiers, so caution is
needed when applying the method to other architectures.
5. Experiments
We show further experimental results supporting our hy-
pothesis that the Mahalanobis distance-based score utilizes
information that is not critical for the original classification.
5.1. Settings
Evaluation We evaluate confidence scores on threshold-
based detectors of test data and out-of-distribution data. We
measure the following metrics: the true negative rate (TNR)
at 95% true positive rate (TPR), the area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve (AUROC), the area under the
precision-recall curve (AUPR), and the detection accuracy.
Neural Classifiers For experiments on intermediate fea-
tures of ResNet (He et al., 2016) and DenseNet (Huang
et al., 2017), we use the implementation by Lee et al. (2018)
1. We evaluate the networks on several data sets: CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky, 2009), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011),
TinyImageNet (Chrabaszcz et al., 2017; Deng et al., 2009),
and LSUN (Yu et al., 2016). For adversarial example detec-
tion, we evaluate on four types of attacks: FGSM (Good-
fellow et al., 2015), BIM (Kurakin et al., 2017), DeepFool
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and CW (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017). We use both input pre-processing and feature
ensemble. The results of the baseline method are slightly
different from what are reported in Lee et al. (2018) since we
re-evaluated them. We also compare adversarial examples
performance with local intrinsic dimensional (LID) (Ma
et al., 2018) implemented by Lee et al. (2018).
Distance-Based Metric Learning We use the implemen-
tation by Chen et al. (2019) 2. We evaluate two types
of distance-based metric learning: Prototypical Networks
(Snell et al., 2017) and Matching Networks (Vinyals et al.,
2016) with four-layer convolutional networks (Conv-4) and
a simplified ResNet (Conv-4 and ResNet-10 in Chen et al.
(2019)). In this experiment, we use two pairs of data
1https://github.com/pokaxpoka/deep_
Mahalanobis_detector
2https://github.com/wyharveychen/
CloserLookFewShot
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Table 3. Out-of-distribution detection on neural classifiers using the marginal Mahalanobis distance-based confidence scores (marginal)
and the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence scores by Lee et al. (2018) (class conditional). “Validation on adversarial samples” is out-
of-distribution performance of detector trained on samples generated by FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Our marginal confidence scores
which does not use class information performs almost as well as the original scores which are based on class conditional distributions.
In-dist OOD
Validation on OOD samples Validation on adversarial samples
TNR AUROC Detection TNR AUROC Detection
class conditional / marginal (ours) class conditional / marginal (ours)
CIFAR-10
(Densenet)
SVHN 90.2/87.6 98.1/97.8 93.7/93.2 84.4/84.8 96.7/96.6 91.1/90.9
TinyImageNet 95.2/96.1 98.9/99.1 95.1/95.7 95.2/92.7 98.9/98.3 95.1/95.5
LSUN 97.0/98.0 99.2/99.4 96.2/96.9 97.2/95.7 99.3/98.9 96.3/95.5
CIFAR-100
(Densenet)
SVHN 80.8/77.7 97.0/96.7 91.2/90.4 46.3/39.2 87.1/86.5 80.1/79.2
TinyImageNet 86.9/87.5 97.4/97.5 92.2/92.0 87.4/87.0 97.0/97.2 91.9/91.7
LSUN 91.8/90.9 98.0/98.0 93.9/93.6 91.8/90.3 98.0/97.8 93.9/93.3
SVHN
(Densenet)
CIFAR-10 96.8/94.5 98.9/98.5 96.0/95.7 95.8/82.9 98.5/94.2 95.6/90.3
TinyImageNet 99.9/99.9 99.9/99.9 98.9/98.9 100.0/99.3 99.9/99.5 98.9/98.3
LSUN 100.0/99.9 99.9/99.9 99.3/99.2 100.0/99.8 99.9/99.8 99.2/98.8
CIFAR-10
(ResNet)
SVHN 96.4/96.0 99.1/99.1 95.8/95.5 87.2/86.5 96.0/97.3 91.9/91.7
TinyImageNet 97.1/97.4 99.5/99.5 96.3/96.4 87.7/94.0 96.3/98.5 91.8/94.6
LSUN 98.9/99.0 99.7/99.8 97.7/97.8 93.3/97.2 97.9/99.2 94.0/96.3
CIFAR-100
(ResNet)
SVHN 91.9/88.7 98.4/97.6 93.7/92.6 44.2/44.1 85.8/88.0 78.0/81.1
TinyImageNet 90.9/91.9 98.2/98.3 93.3/93.6 44.1/61.9 66.4/76.1 71.9/79.0
LSUN 90.9/93.3 98.2/98.4 93.6/94.3 26.7/46.7 52.8/66.2 63.3/72.4
SVHN
(ResNet)
CIFAR-10 98.4/98.3 99.3/99.2 96.9/96.8 95.7/95.2 98.4/98.2 95.4/95.2
TinyImageNet 99.9/99.9 99.9/99.9 99.1/99.1 99.4/99.4 99.4/99.4 98.9/98.9
LSUN 99.9/99.9 99.9/99.9 99.5/99.5 100.0/100.0 99.9/99.9 99.5/99.5
sets: CUB-200-2011 (Wah et al., 2011) vs. mini-ImageNet
(Vinyals et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2019; Ravi & Larochelle,
2017), and Omniglot vs. EMNIST (Cohen et al., 2017). For
both of the pairs, the models are trained on “base” data, and
anomaly detection is evaluated on “novel” data of training
and out-of-distribution data. How the data sets are split
are explained in Chen et al. (2019). For comparison, we
evaluate neural classifiers using the same architectures and
cross entropy as a loss function.
5.2. Neural Classifiers
We perform the same experiments as in Lee et al. (2018) and
demonstrate that our method is as effective as the original
method in most of the cases.
Out-of-distribution Detection Table 3 shows performance
of out-of-distribution detection on intermediate features of
neural classifiers. “Validation on OOD samples” is the
out-of-distribution detectors trained on the corresponding
out-of-distribution data, and “Validation on adversarial sam-
ples” is evaluation of the robustness, which shows outlier
detection performance of detectors trained on adversarial
samples generated by FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015). In
both settings, out-of-distribution detection with our marginal
Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score performs as
well as the original score by Lee et al. (2018).
Adversarial Examples Detection Table 4 shows adversar-
ial detection performance. Our Mahalanobis distance-based
confidence score is as effective as the class conditional
method by Lee et al. (2018) in most cases. “Detection
of unknown attack” evaluates a detector trained on FGSM,
and shows that our confidence score also generalizes well
to other types of attacks. However, our model is slightly
worse than the original class conditional method for some
cases (e.g. CIFAR-10 on DenseNet, CIFAR-100 on ResNet),
so some class conditional information may be useful in ad-
versarial examples detection. However, we note that our
method marginally outperforms LID (Ma et al., 2018) and
also achieves state-of-the-art performance.
5.3. Distance-Based Metric Learning
Table 5 shows out-of-distribution detection performance
of the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score eval-
uated on distance-based metric learning architectures. We
only use the final features, without using feature ensembles
nor input pre-processing. Since in-distribution data sets
evaluated here have too many labels, we only evaluate our
marginal method. For CUB vs. mini-ImageNet, it seems that
neural classifiers and metric learning models exhibit similar
out-of-distribution behavior on the final features; the Maha-
lanobis distance outperforms the Euclidean distance. How-
ever, metric learning models exhibit unexpected behaviors
for Omniglot vs. EMNIST; the detection performance of the
Euclidean distance is better on the metric learning models
for this pair of data sets. Our experimental results suggest
that the intermediate features of distance-based metric learn-
ing models do not always have the property that principal
components with small explained variance provide informa-
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Table 4. AUROC for adversarial example detection on neural classifiers using LID (Ma et al., 2018), the class conditional Mahalanobis
distance-based score by Lee et al. (2018) (Conditional), and our marginal Mahalanobis distance-based score (Marginal). Our confidence
score achieves competitive performance when compared to the original method for many cases.
Model Dataset Score Detection of known attack Detection of unknown attackFGSM BIM DeepFool CW BIM DeepFool CW
DenseNet
CIFAR-10
LID 98.3 99.7 85.1 80.3 94.0 70.4 68.8
Conditional 99.9 99.8 83.4 84.9 99.5 83.2 85.7
Marginal (ours) 99.9 99.8 81.1 82.4 99.2 79.3 81.2
CIFAR-100
LID 99.3 98.1 69.8 69.6 78.7 68.2 68.8
Conditional 99.9 99.3 77.6 82.7 98.7 77.0 80.2
Marginal (ours) 99.9 99.2 76.9 81.6 98.1 74.3 78.7
SVHN
LID 99.3 94.8 91.9 94.1 92.0 80.1 81.2
Conditional 99.9 99.3 95.1 96.5 99.2 94.2 96.4
Marginal (ours) 99.9 99.0 92.2 95.0 98.8 90.2 93.4
ResNet
CIFAR-10
LID 99.7 96.6 88.5 83.0 94.0 73.6 78.1
Conditional 100.0 99.6 91.4 95.9 99.0 80.6 94.3
Marginal (ours) 100.0 99.6 91.0 95.8 99.5 86.2 95.6
CIFAR-100
LID 98.4 97.0 71.8 78.4 59.8 65.1 76.2
Conditional 99.8 96.7 85.3 92.0 96.4 81.9 91.1
Marginal (ours) 99.8 97.7 73.5 90.4 97.1 69.8 87.6
SVHN
LID 97.9 90.6 92.2 88.3 82.2 68.5 75.1
Conditional 99.6 97.1 95.7 92.2 95.8 73.9 87.9
Marginal (ours) 99.6 97.2 95.2 91.9 95.3 70.2 86.2
Table 5. Marginal Mahalanobis distance-based out-of-distribution detection on distance-based metric learning models. We evaluate
Prototypical Networks (ProtoNet), Matching Networks (MatchNet), and ordinary neural classifiers (Classifier). “Conv” and “ResNet”
denote Conv-4 and ResNet-10 in Chen et al. (2019). “Maha” and “Eucl” denote the Mahalanobis and Euclidean distance.
Model Method Score in-dist out-dist TNR atTPR 95% AUROC
Detection
Accuracy
AUPR
in
AUPR
out
Conv
(Classifier) Maha
Omniglot EMNIST
98.27 80.65 75.65 31.81 96.14
(Classifier) Eucl 95.77 47.48 58.83 13.37 87.62
ProtoNet Maha 97.80 80.34 72.84 38.66 95.63
ProtoNet Eucl 98.05 84.71 76.85 50.53 96.58
MatchNet Maha 96.02 57.47 60.04 16.20 89.93
MatchNet Eucl 98.35 72.43 75.09 22.46 94.73
Conv
(Classifier) Maha
CUB ImageNet
9.34 60.21 57.69 95.11 11.1
(Classifier) Eucl 8.57 52.73 52.38 93.62 8.37
ProtoNet Maha 32.93 61.97 58.92 86.15 26.97
ProtoNet Eucl 16.22 55.68 54.94 82.59 21.95
MatchNet Maha 25.31 64.07 61.69 88.12 26.21
MatchNet Eucl 12.50 53.46 54.17 83.38 20.23
ResNet
(Classifier) Maha
CUB ImageNet
14.10 51.60 54.20 83.29 19.43
(Classifier) Eucl 20.87 50.50 51.01 80.93 20.31
ProtoNet Maha 21.07 61.93 59.99 87.35 24.85
ProtoNet Eucl 19.58 46.49 50.10 77.74 18.83
MatchNet Maha 35.51 67.59 63.67 90.05 29.31
MatchNet Eucl 21.36 52.07 52.43 82.41 20.86
tion for anomaly detection. This observation suggests that
the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score utilizes
the unique property of ordinary neural classifiers, and its
performance may depend on model architecture along with
the choice of in-distribution and out-of-distribution data.
Furthermore, for CUB vs. ImageNet, Table 5 shows that
detection performance on the neural classifier and Matching
Networks is influenced by model architecture. For neural
classifiers, Table 3 and 4 also suggest sensitivity of detection
performance to model architecture choice. In conclusion,
caution is required when applying the Mahalanobis distance-
based confidence score to new architectures or data sets.
6. Conclusion
The Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score, an
anomaly detection method proposed by Lee et al. (2018),
achieves state-of-the-art performance. This paper is the first
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work analyzing why this method can detect anomalous in-
puts effectively while imposing the implausible assumption
that class conditional distributions have tied covariance. We
demonstrate that the subspace spanned by principal com-
ponents with small explained variance contain information
critical for anomaly detection, and our method that is not
using class information achieves competitive performance
with the original method. This observation suggests that
it does not use information that is critical for the original
classification task although the method by Lee et al. (2018)
scores the prediction confidence for the original classifica-
tion task, so it reveals that the reason for its effectiveness has
been misunderstood. We also reveal misunderstandings in
input pre-processing, a technique that significantly improves
the performance and the applicability of the method. This
work provides critical insight into the new standard anomaly
detection method and the behavior of neural networks to-
wards anomalous inputs.
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A. Input Pre-Processing
We provide further experimental results analyzing input pre-processing by Lee et al. (2018). Figure 5 to 22 show that
input pre-processing does not always improve detection performance. When L1 norms of input pre-processing for out-of-
distribution inputs on the final features are sufficiently larger than these for in-distribution inputs, detection performance will
be improved as mentioned in the main part (Figure 5, 8, 17). However, in some cases, input pre-processing does not improve
performance as it does not make the Mahalanobis distance of out-of-distribution inputs sufficiently large. When L1 norms of
in-distribution inputs are larger than these of out-of-distribution inputs, i.e. the situation corresponding to what is discussed
in Liang et al. (2018), detection performance does not improve (Figure 15, 16, 18, 19). To sum up, our experiments show
that the effect of input pre-processing depends on the network architecture and choice of data set.
B. Mahalanobis Distance on Autoencoders
Settings We evaluate autoencoders trained on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and CIFAR-10. We use Fashion-MNIST (Xiao
et al., 2017) and SVHN as out-of-distribution data, respectively. Our implementation is based on a code from the Keras
blog 3. We use training data from MNIST and CIFAR-10 to calculate parameters for the Mahalanobis distances, and evaluate
out-of-distribution detectors on test data from in-distribution and out-of-distribution data sets. In this experiment, we only
use the final features, and do not apply input processing nor feature ensemble.
Experiments Table 6 shows that the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score effectively detects out-of-distribution
inputs on the representation space of the autoencoders in our settings. For CIFAR-10 vs SVHN, even the Euclidean
distance is enough to effectively detect out-of-distribution data. For MNIST vs. Fashion-MNIST, intermediate features of
autoencoders exhibit similar properties to these of neural classifiers. The marginal Mahalanobis distance achieves almost
the same performance as the original Mahalanobis distance, even when the partial Mahalanobis distance using principal
components with small explained variance is used. The performance of the above three methods outperforms the Euclidean
distance and the partial Mahalanobis distance using principal components with large explained variance, which is consistent
with the behavior of features of neural classifiers. However, as these confidence scores are sensitive to the choice of
architecture and data set for metric learning models, caution is needed when applying the method to other architectures and
data sets.
Table 6. Mahalanobis distance-based out-of-distribution detection on representation spaces of autoencoders. “Maha” denotes Mahalanobis
distance, and “Eucl” denotes Euclidean distance. “Marg” denotes our marginal method, and “Class” denotes the original method by Lee
et al. (2018).
Method type in-dist out-dist TNR atTPR 95% AUROC
Detection
Accuracy
AUPR
in
AUPR
out
Maha Class MNIST Fashion 95.15 99.62 97.23 99.67 99.59
Maha Marg MNIST Fashion 95.07 99.55 96.91 99.52 99.60
Maha(20-128) Marg MNIST Fashion 95.08 99.48 96.54 99.44 99.54
Maha(1-20) Marg MNIST Fashion 94.53 97.85 92.62 98.21 97.30
Eucl Class MNIST Fashion 94.24 97.05 90.96 97.39 96.87
Maha Marg CIFAR-10 SVHN 27.75 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Maha(20-128) Marg CIFAR-10 SVHN 27.75 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Eucl Marg CIFAR-10 SVHN 88.68 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3https://blog.keras.io/building-autoencoders-in-keras.html
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(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) SVHN (d) AUROC
Figure 5. ResNet CIFAR-10 SVHN
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 6. ResNet CIFAR-10 ImageNet
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 7. ResNet CIFAR-10 LSUN
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) SVHN (d) AUROC
Figure 8. ResNet CIFAR-100 SVHN
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(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 9. ResNet CIFAR-100 ImageNet
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 10. ResNet CIFAR-100 LSUN
(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) CIFAR-10 (d) AUROC
Figure 11. ResNet SVHN CIFAR-10
(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 12. ResNet SVHN ImageNet
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(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 13. ResNet SVHN LSUN
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) SVHN (d) AUROC
Figure 14. DenseNet CIFAR-10 SVHN
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 15. DenseNet CIFAR-10 ImageNet
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-10 (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 16. DenseNet CIFAR-10 LSUN
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(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) SVHN (d) AUROC
Figure 17. DenseNet CIFAR-100 SVHN
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 18. DenseNet CIFAR-100 ImageNet
(a) L1 Norm (b) CIFAR-100 (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 19. DenseNet CIFAR-100 LSUN
(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) CIFAR-10 (d) AUROC
Figure 20. DenseNet SVHN CIFAR-10
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(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) ImageNet (d) AUROC
Figure 21. DenseNet SVHN ImageNet
(a) L1 Norm (b) SVHN (c) LSUN (d) AUROC
Figure 22. DenseNet SVHN LSUN
